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JURISDICTION 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case because the 
appeal was not timely filed. The Commission issued its final 
decision on November 20, 1991. (R. 78.) On December 10, 1991, the 
Galleria petitioned the Commission for reconsideration of its 
order. (R. 69.) The Commission issued its order on this petition 
on March 10, 1992. (R. 29.) The Galleria filed its appeal on 
April 7, 1992. (R. 31.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-504 (1992) states: 
The action of the Commission on the taxpayer's 
Petition for Redetermination of Deficiency 
shall be final 30 days after the date of 
mailing of the Commission's Notice of Agency 
Action. All tax, interest, and penalties are 
due 30 days from the date of mailing unless 
taxpayer seeks judicial review. 
Section 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989) sets the requirements for judicial 
review of final agency action: 
A party shall file a Petition for Judicial 
Review of Final Agency Action within 30 days 
after the date that the order constituting the 
final agency action is issued or is considered 
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-
13(3)(b). 
The order is issued when signed by the Commission. Dusty's 
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992). 
Section 63-46b-13 (1989) allows a party to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the agency "within 20 days after the date that 
an order is issued . . . if the order would otherwise constitute 
final agency action. . . . " Under § 63-46b-13(3)(b) an Order 
denying a Request for Reconsideration is deemed to be issued 20 
days after the filing of the request if no action is taken. 
The Galleria filed its Motion for Reconsideration on December 
10, 1991. (R. 69.) No action was taken by the Commission within 
20 days. Therefore, pursuant to § 63-46b-13(3)(b), an Order was 
deemed to have issued denying the motion on December 30, 1991. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989), Petitioner 
"shall file a Petition for Judicial Review within 30 days after the 
date the Order . . . is considered to have been issued under 
Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)." The Galleria would have had to 
appeal the Order that was deemed to have issued by January 29, 
1992. It did not file until April 7, 1992. (R. 31.) Accordingly, 
the appeal was untimely and the Court lacks jurisdiction. 
The provisions of § 63-46b-13(3) (b) are tied to the provisions 
of § 63-46b-14(3) (a) in order to insure that a Motion for 
Reconsideration cannot indefinitely delay the time for filing an 
appeal. The Court should therefore strictly enforce the time limit 
set forth therein. 
ISSUES 
I. Whether the Court Should Issue an Advisory Opinion on the 
Future Taxability of the Galleria's Roller Rink and Batting Cages 
and on Alleged Federal Equal Protection Clause and Due Process 
Clause Violations Involving Them, Where the Commission Imposed No 
Liability on These Items for the Audit Period that is Now before 
the Court? 
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Standard of Review: (Not applicable.) 
II. Whether the Commission Properly Found that the Galleria's 
Batting Cages, Laser Tag, and Roller Skating are "Admissions" for 
Sales Tax Where Each Involve Entrance to an Enclosed Area. 
Standard of Review; Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
(1989) this Court can grant relief to Appellant if the agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law. This issue is a 
question of law and is therefore reviewed under a correction of 
error standard with no deference given to the agency's 
interpretation. Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. State Tax Comm'n, 
814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991). 
III. Whether There is a Rational Basis for the Commission's 
Ruling that the Galleria's Roller Rink, Laser Tag, and Batting 
Cages are Subject to Sales Tax for Admissions When the Commission's 
Rational for Admissions is the Same as that From the Supreme Court 
of Another State? 
Standard of Review; This issue is a question of law and is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard with no deference 
given to the agency's interpretation. Morton Int'l v. Auditing 
Div. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appendix 1. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-504 (1992). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989). 
3 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3) (1989). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992). 
5. Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-33S. 
6. Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-34S. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Tax Commission 
denying a Petition for Redetermination of sales tax. On February 
21, 1990, the Galleria was assessed sales tax on admissions to 
batting cages, laser tag and roller skating. (R. 72, 190-191.) 
The Galleria filed a petition for redetermination of these taxes, 
and requested that the Commission abate all tax, interest and 
penalties. (R. 187.) On November 20, 1991, the Commission found 
the taxes should be imposed on these admissions, but made its 
ruling prospective only for the batting cages and roller skating. 
(R. 77.) The Galleria was liable for payment of tax on laser game 
receipts. (Id.) On December 10, 1991, the Galleria petitioned for 
reconsideration of that decision, but was denied relief on March 
10, 1992. (R. 69, 29.) A subsequent motion to stay the order was 
denied (1, 33.) An untimely writ of review was filed with the 
Supreme Court on April 7, 1992. (R. 31.) The case was 
subsequently reassigned to the Court of Appeals. 
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FACTS 
In February 1990, the Galleria was assessed sales tax, 
penalty, and interest. (R. 190-191, 17). The tax was for sales 
made, among other things, on admissions to the Galleria's batting 
cages, laser tag, and roller skating rink. (R.73). The Galleria 
filed a petition for redetermination of the taxes, specifically 
asking "that the Tax Commission determine that there is no 
deficiency for sales tax for the Audit Period July 1, 1986 through 
June 30, 1989, and that the Tax Commission abate all taxes, 
interest and penalties assessed in the statutory notice." (R. 
187. ) 
The batting cages are individual boxes, divided by chain link 
that encloses balls hit by the entrant; they also act as a 
backstop. (R. 143).x The batting machine throws a specified 
number of pitches at difficultly levels and speeds selected by the 
batter. (Id.-) The batter can either reserve the batting cage 
through a control counter or it can be coin activated to start a 
timer. (R. 144.) 
The record contains few descriptive details about laser tag 
other than it is similar to the batting cages. (R. 144.) "Upon 
payment of a cash fee, customers were provided laser guns and 
sensing devices and engaged in mock combat in an enclosed area." 
1
 The parties below appear to have tried the case on facts 
"generally known" about the Galleria and what was on file with the 
Commission. (Tr. 34, 44.) 
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(R. 144.) Laser tag has subsequently been discontinued by the 
Galleria. (R. 73.) The roller skating activities allow a 
participant to "skate for a period of time upon payment of cash." 
(R.184. ) 
Prior to the audit, the Galleria had requested advice on the 
taxability of the batting cages and roller rink. (R. 76.) It 
received conflicting advise from auditors in the Auditing Division. 
(R. 73.) No advice was sought on the taxability of laser tag. (R. 
77. ) 
At a formal hearing before the Tax Commission, counsel for the 
Galleria argued that if it had a clear determination on the duty to 
impose sales tax on its admissions, for the future, it would 
collect the tax and pass its cost on to the consumer. (Tr. 33.) 
The Commission found that tax should be imposed on these 
admissions, but because of "the unusual circumstances of this 
case," where the Galleria had received conflicting information from 
the Auditing Division, it would "not apply the sales tax 
retroactively to the transactions in questions." (R. 77.) It 
reasoned that because the Galleria could not "recoup the tax from 
its customers, who were originally responsible for payment . . . 
receipts from its batting cages and roller skating rink are not 
subject to sales tax for the period of the audit. However, 
Petitioner did not rely on Commission advice in failing to collect 
sales tax on laser game receipts. The Petitioner is therefore 
liable for payment of tax on those receipts." (R. 77) (emphasis 
6 
added.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As set forth in the Statement of Jurisdiction, the Galleria's 
appeal was untimely. The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. 
The relief sought by the Galleria below was that no sales tax 
be imposed on its batting cages, roller rink, or laser tag for the 
audit period. This relief was granted for the batting cages and 
roller rink. The requested relief sought by the Galleria on appeal 
cannot effect its rights on these issues because they were decided 
so as to avoid harm to the Galleria. Accordingly, the Court should 
refuse an advisory opinion on the future taxability of these items. 
If the Court decides to address the taxability of the batting 
cages and roller skating, the plain language of the statute 
sustains the imposition of sales tax on these items as well as the 
Galleria's laser tag. The Court should examine what general 
purpose the 1933 legislature had when the statute was enacted to 
determine the statutes intended scope. Evidence of the enacting 
legislature's purpose is the broad language used in the statutory 
phrase, "admission to any place of amusement, entertainment or 
recreation." This broad statement of legislative purpose using 
generic terms is evidence that the enacting legislature intended 
that unmentioned transactions are subject to taxation. The statute 
includes the phrase "including seats and tables" as a phrase of 
enlargement. If the Court interprets it as a phrase of limitation, 
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it must ignore other portions of the statute. Such a construction 
was not intended by the enacting legislature. 
Taxation of the Galleria's roller rink, laser tag, and batting 
cages, and not its bowling facility, is rational under the 
definition of admission. Admission means entering a place, not 
participation in an activity. The Commission's application of the 
statute is consistent with this definition. Accordingly, the 
Commission's application of the statute is rationally related to 
its intended purpose. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD REFUSE AN ADVISORY OPINION ON THE FUTURE 
TAXABILITY OF THE GALLERIA'S ROLLER RINK AND BATTING 
CAGES AND ON ALLEGED EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE VIOLATIONS INVOLVING THEM. 
The relief sought by the Galleria below was that no sales tax 
be imposed on the batting cages, roller rink, and laser tag for the 
audit period.2 (R. 187.) This relief was granted for the batting 
cages and roller rink. (R. 77.) "[W]hen the requested relief 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants" a case is moot. Salt 
Lake v. Tax Comm'n, 813 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1991) (amendment of 
statute while case is pending on appeal moots the appeal; quoting 
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)). This is due 
to a "longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory 
2
 As set forth in the Statement of Jurisdiction, the Galleria 
did not bring its appeal in a timely manner. Therefore, the Court 
lacks jurisdiction. 
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opinions," the court will "not generally consider mooted questions 
on appeal," Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). The Court should remand these issues and order their 
dismissal. Merhish v. H. A. Folsom & Associates, 646 P.2d 731, 733 
(Utah 1982). The relief sought on these issues on appeal cannot 
affect the rights of the Galleria because only the contested audit 
period is before the Court.3 
Likewise, the Intervenor argues that the Auditing Division has 
incorrectly treated its batting cages and roller rink differently 
than other amusements, and has violated the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution. (See Intervenor's 
Brief at 9-16) Even if this treatment were unjustified, which it 
was not, the Commission abated all tax on these items. (R. 77.) 
The Galleria suffered no harm. Accordingly, the Court need not 
address these issues. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD LOOK AT THE ENACTING LEGISLATURE'S 
PURPOSE
 f AS EVIDENCED BY THE BROAD TERMS IT USED IN 
DEFINING "ADMISSION, " TO SUSTAIN IMPOSITION OF SALES TAX 
ON THE GALLERIA'S LASER TAG, ROLLER RINK, AND BATTING 
CAGES. 
A. When Interpreting an Older Statute , the Court 
Should Examine What General Purpose The Legislature 
Had When the Statute was Enacted. 
If the Court decides to address the issues of the Galleria's 
batting cages and Roller Rink, the plain language of the statutory 
3
 This issue is ripe for future periods unaffected by this 
appeal. See Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) ("actual or imminent clash of legal right and obligations" 
makes case ripe for adjudication). 
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definition of "admission" makes the Galleria's batting cage, roller 
rink, and laser tag subject to sales tax. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-
12-103(1)(f) (1992).A In beginning its analysis, the Court should 
recall that: 
[T]axing statutes should generally be construed favorable 
to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority 
. . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is also to be 
considered the over-arching principle, applicable to all 
statutes, that they should be construed and applied in 
accordance with the intent of the Legislature and the 
purpose sought to be accomplished. 
Parson Asphalt Products v. Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 
1980) (footnote omitted). 
The statute was enacted in 1933; no record exists of 
legislative intent, except the statute itself. The Court should 
examine what purpose the legislature had when the statute was 
enacted. One noted commentator has explained: 
[A]s a statute gains in age—its language is called upon 
to deal with circumstances utterly uncontemplated at the 
time of its passage. Here the quest is not properly for 
the sense originally intended by the statute, for the 
sense sought originally to be put into it, but rather for 
the sense which can be quarried out of it in the light of 
the new situation. Broad purposes can indeed reach far 
beyond details known or knowable at the time of drafting. 
A "dangerous weapon" statute of 1840 can include tommy 
guns, tear gas or atomic bombs. "Vehicle," in a statute 
of 1840, can properly be read, when sense so suggests, to 
include an automobile, or a hydroplane that lacks wheels. 
A
 The statute, prior to its amendment, effective March b, 
1987, provided for taxation "of the amount paid for admission to 
any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-15-4(l)(d) (Supp. 1986); Laws of Utah Ch. 5 § 23 (1987). 
It defined admission. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(9). The changes 
effective March 6, 1987 appear to make only technical changes. 
(See disc containing January 28, 1987 floor debate.) 
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But for all that, the sound quest does not run primarily 
in terms of historical intent. It runs in terms of what 
the words can be made to bear, in making sense in the 
light of the unforeseen. 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. 
L. Rev. 395 (1950) (printed in extracted form in Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, Vol 2A 539, 541 (5th ed.)). Accordingly, 
the Court should look at the legislature's purpose to determine if 
that purpose fits the taxation of the Galleria's amusements. 
B. Evidence of the Enacting Legislature's Purpose Is 
Contained In the Broad Language Used in the 
Statutory Phrase "Admission to Any Place of 
Amusement, Entertainment, or Recreation." 
The statutory definition of "admission" provides: 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser 
for the amount paid or charged for the 
following: 
. . . . 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation, including seats 
and tables reserved or otherwise, and other 
similar accommodations; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1992). 
The phrase "admission to any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation" is broad. The word admission means 
"the 'price of entrance;' the change for 'permission or right to 
enter' a place." Grauer v. Director of Revenue, 396 P.2d 260, 264 
(Kan. 1964)(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary). 
The word "any" refers to all places of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation. It cannot be construed as a term of limitation. See 
11 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Central Wever Sewer Improvement 
Dist. , 287 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1955) ("To argue that 'any taxpayer' 
means only "real property owner" is to blind oneself to the words 
and realities. . . .") The words "amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation" are generic, and do not refer to any specific 
transaction. This broad statement of legislative purpose using 
generic terms is evidence that the enacting legislature intended 
that unmentioned transactions are subject to taxation. 
Accordingly, these activities fall within the statutory meaning of 
admission. 
C. The Word "Including" Is a Term of Enlargement That 
Evidences The Legislative Purpose of Including 
Seats and Tables in the Statutory Category of 
"Admission." 
The tax is levied on "admissions." This means: 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation, including seats 
and tables reserved or otherwise, and other 
similar accommodations; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992). "The term 'including' as 
a word of enlargement, implies that something else has been given 
beyond the general language which precedes it; that it adds to the 
general clause a species which does not naturally belong to it; 
that it is the equivalent of "also." Albertson's, Inc. v. Hansen, 
600 P.2d 982, 990 (Utah 1979) (Maughan, J., dissenting.) Although 
the preceding definition comes from a dissenting opinion, it is 
consistent with the existing, more antiquated, Utah case law 
examining this question. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Montello Salt Co., 98 P. 
549 (Utah 1908), rev'd, 221 U.S. 452 (1911), in interpreting a 
federal law, likewise determined that the term "including" was a 
term of enlargement. In drawing this conclusion, the court looked 
at what it believed to be the intent of the enacting legislature, 
98 P. at 551. The court's decision was later overturned after the 
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation of 
legislative intent. The legal principle from these cases is that 
the term "including" is generally a term of enlargement, but may 
not be if that is the legislative intent. 
In this case, to conclude that the term "including" is a term 
of limitation would require the Court to violate a fundamental 
principle of statutory interpretation that requires, if possible, 
that every word of a statute be given effect. Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 1988). If tax must be collected for 
admission only to places "including seats and tables reserved or 
otherwise," the larger part of the statute must be ignored. 
(Intervener's Brief at 6-8.) The phrase "any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation" would become surplusage. Likewise, 
the phrase "and other similar accommodations" would become 
meaningless. Certainly, this was unintended by the enacting 
legislature. 
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III. TAXATION OF THE GALLERIA'S ROLLER RINKf LASER TAGf AND 
BATTING CAGES, AND NOT ITS BOWLING FACILITY, IS RATIONAL 
UNDER THE DEFINITION OF "ADMISSION." 
The Intervenor states that the Commission's application of the 
statute must be supported by a rational basis or it violates 
federal equal protection and due process standards.5 (Intervener's 
Brief at 9-16.) The Commission's application of the statute is 
consistent with the terms used by the legislature. One of the 
Commission's rules, interpreting admission, provides, in part, 
"Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. . 
. ." Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-33S (emphasis added). The other 
rule interpreting "place of amusement, entertainment or recreation" 
provides that they are "broad in meaning, but convey[] the basic 
idea of a definite location, even though such charge includes the 
right of the purchaser to participate in some activity within the 
place. . . . " Id. at R865-19-34S (emphasis added). In this case, 
the Commission held that admissions to both the batting cage and 
laser tag were taxable because they occurred within an "enclosed 
area."6 (R. 76) (emphasis added). The Commission found roller 
These issues were never expressly petitioned below. See 
Amended Petition for Redetermination. (R. 183-187.) Some 
references were made to vagueness below; however, never within the 
express theoretical context argued by the Intervenor for the first 
time on appeal. See e.g. (R. 66, 124) (vagueness); see also (R. 
117)(due process). 
6
 These rules and the Commission's decision, not statements 
made by the auditors or Attorney General's Office, (R. 28), 
represent the policies of the Commission. See Morton Int'l v. 
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 595 (Utah 1991). The Galleria 
conceded below that a draft letter from the Attorney General's 
14 
skating taxable because it was specifically mentioned in an 
administrative rule. (R. 75-76.) Accordingly, the Commission's 
rules and decision rest upon paid entrance into a specific place. 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Grauer v. Director of Revenue, 396 
P. 2d 260 (Kan. 1964) interpreted a statute similar to Utah's 
statute. At issue in Grauer was whether bowling was subject to a 
sales tax for admissions. The court reasoned: 
[W]hat the legislature taxed . . . was the 
price of admission to enter a place of 
amusement, entertainment or recreation. Had 
the legislature by its enactment intended to 
impose a tax on charges for participation in 
such activities as bowling, it could have 
easily done so. The fact that it did not do 
so is persuasive that it was not the intention 
of the legislature to impose a tax on charges 
made for participation in recreation 
activities. 
396 P. 2d at 264. Accordingly, the court found that admission means 
the price of entering a place, not participation in an activity. 
Thus, the Commission's interpretation of the statute, and the 
statutory term "admission" are consistent. 
The Intervenor has argued that the terms of the statute 
require a broader application. (Intervener's Brief at 10.) They 
have argued that certain untaxed activities are subject to tax. 
(Intervener's Brief at 10-11.) Those activities are not before the 
Office was submitted for argument only, not as evidence. (Tr. 
p. 21.) Finally, there may be some confusion as to the duties of an 
office auditor. (See Intervenor's Brief at 3.)("0ffice auditor of 
the Tax Commission.") An office auditor has no policy making 
responsibilities. (R. 179.) 
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Court in this case, with the exception of bowling; no advisory 
opinion should be given on them. If the Intervener's argument is 
accepted, the Court should remand the case back to the Commission 
ordering it to impose tax on Galleria activities that fall within 
the Intervener's broad definition of "admission." 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should find that the appeal was untimely as set 
forth in the Statement of Jurisdiction. If it does not, the 
Commission granted much of the relief sought by the Galleria. The 
Court should refuse an advisory opinion on issues that do not 
affect the Galleria's rights during the audit period. The Court 
should examine the broad definition of "admission" as set forth in 
the statutes plain language to conclude that entrance into a 
batting cage, laser tag area, or roller rink fall within the 
enacting legislature's purpose. Finally, the Court should rule 
that taxation of the Galleria's roller rink, laser tax, and batting 
cages, and not its bowling facility, is rational under the 
legislatures definition of admission. For these reasons, the Court 
should sustain the Commission's decision. 
DATED this IJ -— day of March, 1993. 
C.?V|%C 
JOHN C. McCARREY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX 1 
M GENERAL TAXATION POLICIES 59-1-505 
ning the identity and other 
le tax returns or to pay any 
t least three years and then 
y of a class A misdemeanor. 
, he shall be dismissed from 
3 in this state for a period of 
tax. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Taxation «=» 451 et seq., 
1085. 
59-1-502. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 314 re-
peals § 59-1-502, as amended by Laws 1987, 
ch. 149, § 1, relating to determinations by the 
commission, hearings, procedures, standards, 
and the barring of petitions for refund, effec-
tive January 1, 1988. 
"class B" in the first sentence in 
5). 
ferences. — Sentencing for misde-
76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
< Comm'n, 813 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
» disclosure in Subsection (1) can-
bly be read to negate the express 
for disclosure contained in Sub-
*nd incorporated into the adhesion 
t the commission requires all local 
*ign if they want to enact a local 
s tax. Salt Lake City v. Tax 
.3 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1991). 
Millard County v. State Tax 
Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1991). 
ES 
59-1-503. Assessment and payment of amount determined. 
(1) Following a redetermination of a deficiency by the commission, the en-
tire amount redetermined as the deficiency by the decision of the commission, 
which has become final, shall be assessed and shall be paid within 30 days 
from the date of mailing of the notice and demand from the commission. 
(2) If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the commission within the 
time prescribed for filing the petition, the deficiency, notice of which has been 
mailed to the taxpayer shall be assessed, and shall be paid within 30 days 
from the date of mailing of the notice and demand from the commission. 
History: C. 1953, 59-30-3, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 283, § 8; renumbered by L. 1987, 
ch. 3, § 47; 1987, ch. 161, § 212; 1991, ch. 51, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted 
"within 30 days from the date of mailing of the 
notice" for "within ten days after notice" near 
the end of Subsections (1) and (2), and deleted 
former Subsection (3), concerning the com-
mencement date of the former ten-day period. 
59-1-504. Time determination final. 
The action of the commission on the taxpayer's petition for redetermination 
of deficiency shall be final 30 days after the date of mailing of the commis-
sion's notice of agency action. All tax, interest, and penalties are due 30 days 
from the date of mailing, unless the taxpayer seeks judicial review. 
vtlNATION OF 
determination of a de-
cion, petitioning the commis-
History: C. 1953, 59-30-4, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 283, § 8; renumbered by L. 1987, 
ch. 3, § 48; 1987, ch. 161, § 213. 
59-1-505. Deposit of amount due prerequisite to appeal. 
A taxpayer who, after receiving a final decision from the commission in 
accordance with the other provisions of this part, desires to seek judicial 
review of that decision shall deposit the full amount of the taxes, interest, and 
penalties with the commission. 
History: C. 1953, 59-30-5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 283, § 8; renumbered by L. 1987, 
ch. 3, § 49; 1987, ch. 161, § 214. 
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63-46b-13 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L. present Subsections (l)(b)(i) to (iv); inserted "or 
1987, ch. 161, § 268; 1988, ch. 72, § 22. within the time period provided by agency 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- rule, whichever is longer" in Subsection (2); 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the and made minor stylistic changes, 
former introductory paragraph in Subsection Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
(1) as present Subsection (l)(a), substituting §
 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1, 
"30 days" for "ten days" in that paragraph, and jggg 
redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (d) as 
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which 
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is 
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not 
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one 
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue 
a written order granting the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does 
not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the 
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-13, enacted by L. stating the specific grounds upon which relief 
1987, ch. 161, § 269; 1988, ch. 72, § 23. i8 requested"; deleted "or the order on review" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
 a t t n e end in Subsection (1Kb); and substituted 
ment, effective April 25 1988 subdivided Sub- "reconsideration" for "rehearing" in Subsection 
section (1) and rewrote Subsection (l)(a), which (QVK) 
had read "Within ten days after the date that J,'* .. _. .
 T ._„_ , . „. 
an order on review is issued, or within ten days . Effective Dates. - Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
after the date that a final order is issued for § 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1, 
which agency review is unavailable, any party 1988. 
may file a written request for reconsideration 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
( D A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
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(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-14, enacted by L. to have been issued under Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24. 63-46b-13(3)(b)M in Subsection (3); and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, divided former Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and § 315
 m akes the act effective on January 1, (2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as 1988. 
present Subsection (3); added "or is considered 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of 
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or 
maintains his principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial re-
view; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, 
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the 
agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceed-
ing; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is 
entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief 
requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to 
relief, 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
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59-12-103 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
deemed wholesale purchases and exempt from 
the sales tax. Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax 
Comra., 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998 (1964). 
59-12-103, Sales and use tax base — Rate. 
~)f(l) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state; 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to telephone or telegraph corpo-
rations, whether the corporations are municipally or privately owned, for: 
(i) all transportation; 
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or 
(iii) telegraph service; 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for commercial consumption; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
^f"(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, 
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar ac-
commodations; 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or 
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other 
tangible personal property; 
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property; 
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and ser-
vices for less than 30 consecutive days; 
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs 
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property 
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection 
(1) shall be: 
(a) 53/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be: 
(a) 23/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 2% from and after January 1, 1990! 
(4) (a) From January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1999, there shall be 
deposited in an Olympics special revenue fund or funds as determined by 
the Division of Finance under Section 51-5-4, for the use of the Utah 
Sports Authority created under Title 9, Chapter 1, Part 3, Utah Sports 
Authority Act: 
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a 1IM% tax rate on 
the taxable items and services under Subsection (1); 
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a X/M% tax rate under 
Section 59-12-204 on the taxable items and services under Subsection 
(1); and 
(iii) interest earned on the amounts under Subsections (i) and (ii). 
(b) These funds shall be used by the Utah Sports Authority as follows: 
392 
SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-103 
(i) to the extent funds are available, to transfer directly to a debt 
service fund or to otherwise reimburse to the state of Utah any 
amount expended on debt service or any other cost of any bonds 
issued by the state to construct any public sports facility as defined in 
Section 9-1-303; and 
(ii) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, administrative, 
legal, and other expenses of the Utah Sports Authority, but not in-
cluding protocol expenses for seeking and obtaining the right to host 
the Winter Olympic Games. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch. 
110, & 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2; 
L. 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957, 
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, $ 1; 1969, ch. 187, 
§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152, 
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, 5 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1; 
1986, ch. 55, 5 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1989, ch. 41, 
§ 6; 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 5, § 5; 1990, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1990, ch. 171, § 1; 1991, ch. 152, § 1; 
1992, ch. 241, § 370. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted 
"5l/64%" for "5%" in Subsection (2Kb); substi-
tuted "2l/64%" for "2%" in Subsection (3)(b); and 
added Subsection (4). 
The 1989 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effective 
October 10,1989, substituted "5%" for "5 »/64%" 
in Subsection (2Kb); substituted "2%" for "2 
VB4%" in Subsection (3)(b); subdivided Subsec-
tion (4) and rewrote the introductory language 
of Subsection (4)(a), which read: "For fiscal 
year beginning July 1, 1990, there is appropri-
ated to the entity created under Subsection 
11-13-5.5(4)"; substituted "VM%" for "l/32%" in 
two places in Subsection (4)(a)(i); and added 
Subsections (4)(a)(ii) and (4)(b)(i) and (ii). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 171, effective 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Amusement admissions. 
Construction. 
Definitions. 
Dental materials purchased by practitioners. 
Exemption from tax. 
Fractional sales. 
Fuel oil used by railroad. 
Industrial coal. 
Items furnished by motel to guests. 
Laundry service. 
Liability of consumer for tax. 
Municipally owned electric plants. 
Natural gas pipeline. 
Private clubs. 
1 March 9, 1990, rewrote Subsection (4)(a)(i), 
which had read "the amount of sales and use 
; tax generated by 1/64% of the tax levied under 
, Subsection (2Kb) and 1/64% of the tax levied 
, under Subsection (3)(b)" and Subsection 
, (4)(a)(ii), which had read "the amount of reve-
; nue generated by 1/64% of the local option tax 
as provided in Subsection 59-12-205(4)," and 
, inserted "administrative, legal" in Subsection 
i, (4)(b)(ii). 
; The 1990 amendment by ch. 22, effective 
July 1, 1990, subdivided Subsection (1Kb); de-
leted "as defined by Section 54-2-1" after "tele-
1 graph corporations" in paragraph of Subsection 
(1Kb); and added "intrastate" at the beginning 
1 of Subsection (l)(b)(ii). 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
e 1991, inserted "Utah Sports Authority Act" in 
Subsection (4)(a), and added Subsection 
2 (4)(a)(iii). 
The 1992 amendment, effective March 13, 
e 1992, substituted the reference to Title 9, 
1 Chapter 1, Part 3 for a reference to Title 62, 
Chapter 1 in Subsection (4)(a) and the refer-
i ence to § 9-1-303 for a reference to § 62-1-102 
i in Subsection (4)(b)(l). 
1 Cross-References. — County or municipal 
sales and use tax, provisions of ordinance, 
3 § 59-12-204. 
Purchase of coal. 
Purchase price. 
Railroad services. 
Rare and foreign coins. 
Repair sales. 
Sale in sister state. 
Sales of artificial limbs. 
Tourist accommodations and services. 
Transportation. 
Valuation of trade-ins. 
Vendor's duty to collect tax. 
Constitutionality. 
Subsections (l)(c) and (l)(d) have been held 
to be constitutional against various conten-
tions. State Tax Comm. v. City of Logan, 88 
Utah 406, 54 P.2d 1197 (1936). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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property for no additional consideration or nominal 
additional consideration upon compliance with the 
lease agreement. Nominal consideration in this sense 
means ten percent or less of the original lease amount. 
G If the lessee treats a conditional sale lease as a 
sale, and if the lessor is also the vendor of the property, 
the sales price for sales tax purposes must be at least 
equal to the average sales price of similar property. 
H. If the lessee t reats a conditional sale lease as a 
sale, the sales tax must be collected by the lessor on the 
full purchase price of the property at the time of the 
purchase. 
R865-19 -33S . A d m i s s i o n Def ined P u r s u a n t to 
U t a h C o d e Ann. S e c t i o n 59-12-103. 
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter 
into a place. Admission includes the amount paid for 
the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an audi-
torium, theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting 
house, or gymnasium to view any type of entertain-
ment. Admission also includes the right to use a table 
at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such 
charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum 
charge, or any such similar charge. 
1. This applies whether the charge made for the use 
of the seat, table, or similar accommodation is com-
bined with an admission charge to form a single charge, 
or is separate and distinct from an admission charge, or 
is the sole charge. 
B. If the original admission charge carries the right to 
remain in a place, or to use a seat or table, or other sim-
ilar accommodation for a limited time only, and an addi-
tional charge is made for an extension of such time, the 
extra charge is paid for admission within the meaning 
of the law. Where a person or organization acquires the 
sole right to use any place or the right to dispose of all 
of the admissions to any place for one or more occasions, 
the amount paid is not subject to the tax on admissions. 
Such a transaction constitutes a rental of the entire 
place and if the person or organization in turn sells 
admissions, sales tax applies to amounts paid for such 
admissions. 
R865-19-34S. A d m i s s i o n to P l a c e s of A m u s e m e n t 
P u r s u a n t to U t a h Code Ann. Sec t ion 59-12-103. 
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, 
or recreation" is broad in meaning but conveys the basic 
idea of a definite location. 
B. The amount paid for admission to such a place is 
subject to the tax, even though such charge includes the 
right of the purchaser to participate in some activity 
within the place. For example, the sale of a ticket for a 
ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device is an 
admission to a place of amusement. 
C Charges for admissions to swimming pools, skating 
rinks, and other places of amusement are subject to tax. 
Charges for towel rentals, swimming suit rentals, skate 
rentals, etc , are also subject to tax. Locker rental fees 
are subject to sales tax if the lockers are tangible per-
sonal property. 
R865-19-35S. Res ident ia l or C o m m e r c i a l Use of 
Gas, Electricity, Heat, Coal, Fue l Oils or Other 
Fue l s Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec t ion 59-
12-103. 
A. "Commercial consumption" is as denned in 59-12-
102(1). 
B. "Noncommercial consumption" is denned as fuel 
used in: 
1. mining or extraction of minerals; 
2. off highway agriculture, including commercial 
greenhouses, irrigation pumps, farm machinery, and 
other farming activities to produce the agricultural 
product up to the time of harvest or placing products 
into storage facilities; and 
3. use in manufacturing tangible personal property or 
use in producing or compounding of a product which 
will be resold. 
C. All activities not specifically defined as noncom-
mercial or residential consumption are considered as 
commercial consumption. 
D. "Other fuels" means products which burn indepen-
dently to produce heat or energy. 
1. Explosives or material used as active ingredients in 
explosive devices are not fuels. 
E. If a firm has activities which are commercial and 
noncommercial and all fuels are furnished at given 
locations through single meters, the predominant use 
of the fuels shall determine taxable s ta tus of the fuels. 
R865-19-36S. S t r e e t R a i l w a y a n d O t h e r Fares 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec t ion 59-12-103. 
A. "Street railway fare" means an amount paid to a 
street railway or bus, or an extension thereof, by what-
soever power operated, for passenger transportation 
service rendered over a line operating mainly upon, 
along, above, or below any street, avenue, road, high-
way, bridge, or public place within any city or town. 
1. The term does not include a railway or bus used as 
par t of a commercial or interurban system. 
B. All fares paid for intrastate transportation of per-
sons to common carriers having established routes are 
subject to tax, except: 
1. street railways fares, 
2. amounts paid for chartered transportation render-
ing service only to specific parties with whom a contract 
has been made, and 
3. amounts paid for persons traveling in air com-
merce. 
R865-19-37S. E x e m p t S a l e s P u r s u a n t to Utah 
Code Ann. Sect ion 59-12-104. 
A Definitions. 
1. "Commercials," "audio tapes," and "video tapes" 
mean tapes, films, or discs used by television or radio 
stations in regular broadcasting activities but do not 
include blank tapes purchased for newscasts and simi-
lar uses by radio and television stations. 
2. "Motion picture exhibitor" means any person 
engaged in the business of operating a theater or estab-
lishment in which motion pictures are regularly exhib-
ited to the public for a charge. 
3. "Distributor" means persons who purchase or sell 
motion picture films and video tapes which are used by 
a commercial television broadcaster or a motion picture 
exhibitor. 
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APPENDIX 2 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 90-1055 
Account No. D14926 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on December 14, 1990. Alan Hennebold, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Present and representing the Petitioner was F. 
Lavar Christensen, attorney. Present and representing the 
Respondent was Rick Carlton, Assistant Utah Attorney General. 
Following the hearing, the parties submitted memoranda of 
points and authority. 
Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing and 
the parties' memoranda, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is July 1, 1986 through 
June 30, 1989. 
ATTACHMENT 1 
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3. Petitioner operates an indoor entertainment mall 
known as the "49th Street Galleria", which includes arcade 
games, video machines, bowling alley, miniature golf course, 
amusement rides, roller skating rink, batting and pitching 
cages, and food concessions. Petitioner also operated a "laser 
chase4' game which has since been discontinued. 
4. Respondent audited Petitioner for compliance with 
Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act during the period in question. 
Based upon that audit, Respondent assessed additional sales tax 
on Petitioner's receipts from its batting cages, amusement 
rides, roller skating rink, laser chase game and food sales. 
Additional sales tax was also assessed on Petitioner's receipt 
of rental fees for bowling shoes and roller skates. 
5. The audit also reviewed Petitioner's purchases of 
taxable equipment and consumable goods during the audit 
period. Because complete records had not been maintained by 
the Petitioner, 1987 was accepted by Petitioner and Respondent 
as a "test year", with the results applied to the remainder of 
the audit period. 
6. The amount of additional sales and use tax 
assessed under the audit was $59,675.36. Of that amount, 
$20,925.64 arises from taxable purchases of equipment and 
consumable goods upon which no use tax was paid. The remainder 
arises from untaxed receipts for "admissions", rental fees, and 
food. 
7. Respondent audit also assessed interest and a 10% 
negligence penalty of $5,967.53 against Petitioner. 
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8. Petitioner concedes that its receipts from shoe 
and skate rentals, amusement rides and food purchases are 
subject to sales tax. Petitioner disputes the taxability of 
receipts from its batting cages, roller skating rink and laser 
game. 
9. Petitioner's batting cages consist of fenced 
areas containing a machine that pitches baseballs to customers 
standing in the cage. The machine is operated either by tokens 
or by cash payments to an attendant. 
10. Petitioner's roller skating rink is used by 
customers upon payment of a cash fee. 
11. Petitioner's laser chase game was installed some 
time after the Galleria began doing business. It was in use 
during the audit period, but discontinued thereafter. Upon 
payment of a cash fee, customers were provided laser guns and 
sensing devices and engaged in mock combat in an enclosed area. 
12. At Petitioner's request, Kenneth Cook of the 
Auditing Division reviewed the Galleria1s operations during 
early 1984 and advised Petitioner that receipts from batting 
cages and roller skating were subject to sales tax. Because 
the laser game was not yet in use, Mr. Cook expressed no 
opinion on the taxability of receipts from that game. 
13. Thereafter, on August 2, 1984, Petitioner sought 
and received a written opinion from George Loertscher, also 
with the Auditing Division, advising Petitioner that receipts 
from batting cages and roller skating were not taxable. As the 
laser game had not yet been installed, Mr- Loertscher' s written 
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opinion did not comment on the taxability of receipts from that 
source. 
14. On the basis of Mr. Loertscher's letter. 
Petitioner did not collect sales tax on receipts from its 
batting cages and roller skating rink. Nor did Petitioner 
collect sales tax on receipts from its laser game after that 
game was installed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act imposes sales tax on 
the amount paid or charged for "admission to any place of 
amusement, entertainment, or recreation, including seats and 
tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar 
accommodations." [Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(f)]. 
"Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into 
a place. It includes the amount paid for the right to use a 
reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, theatre, circus, 
stadium, schocihouse, meeting house, or gymnasium to view any 
type of entertainment. Admission also includes the right to 
use a table an a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such 
charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any 
such similar charge. (Utah State Tax Commission Administrative 
Rule R865-19-33S. ) 
"Place of amusement, entertainment or recreation" is 
broad in meaning, but conveys the basic idea of a definite 
location. The amount paid for admission to such a place is 
subject to sales tax, even though such charge includes the 
right of the purchaser to participate in some activity within 
the place. For example, the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a 
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mechanical or self operated device is an admission to a place 
of amusement. Charges for admissions to swimming pools, 
skating rinks, and other places of amusement are subject to 
tax. Charges for towel rentals, swimming suit rentals, skate 
rentals, etc are also subject to tax. Locker rental fees are 
subject to sales tax if the lockers are tangible personal 
property. (Utah State Tax Commission Administrative Rule 
R865-19-85S.) 
Every person doing business or storing, using, or 
otherwise consuming tangible personal property in Utah must 
keep and preserve complete records necessary to determine the 
amount of sales and use tax for which such person is liable. 
(Utah State Tax Commission Administrative Rule R865-19-22S.) 
The penalty for negligent underpayment of tax is 10% 
of the underpayment. [Utah Code Ann. §59-1-401(3)3 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Respondent's audit assessed Petitioner with additional 
sales and use tax totalling $59,675.36 for the period July 1, 
1986 through June 30, 1989. The Petitioner does not contest 
the tax assessed on purchases of equipment and consumable 
goods, nor does it contest the tax assessed on its receipts 
from shoe and skate rentals, amusement rides and food sales. 
Thus, the only issues before the Commission are the taxability 
of Petitioner's receipts from its laser game, roller skating 
rink and batting cages, and the imposition of penalty and 
interest. 
The Commission's Rule R865-19-34S specifically 
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provides that "charges _for admissions to . . . skating rinks . 
. are subject to tax." There is no basis for interpreting 
the rule's use of the term" "skating rinks" as applying to ice 
skating rinks only. The Commission concludes that Petitioner's 
receipts from its roller skating rink are subject to sales tax. 
Regarding receipts from batting cages, Petitioner 
contends it does not charge for admission to the cage, but only 
for use of the pitching machine. However, the batting cages 
and pitching machines are an integrated system, one dependent 
upon the other. Use of the pitching machine is not feasible 
outside the enclosed area of the batting cage, and the cage 
serves no purpose without the pitching machine. The Commission 
therefore concludes that receipts from the batting cages are 
payment for "admissions" and subject to sales tax. 
The same is true regarding Petitioner's laser game. 
It took place in an enclosed area with participants using 
specialized equipment provided by the Galleria. Consequently, 
receipts from the laser game are also subject to sales tax. 
In summary, the Commission finds that receipts from 
Petitioner's batting cages, roller skating and laser game are 
charges for admissions within the meaning of Utah's Sales and 
Use Tax Act. However, the Commission must consider the effect 
of Petitioner's reliance upon contrary advice previously given 
by Auditing Division staff. 
During 1984, Petitioner was advised by an Auditing 
Division representative that receipts from the batting cages 
and roller skating rink were subject to sales tax. A few 
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months later, a second Auditing Division representative advised 
Petitioner by letter that receipts from batting cages and 
roller skating were not taxable. After receiving the second 
opinion, Petitioner did not collect sales tax on receipts from 
those two activities. No opinion was ever provided regarding 
the taxability of receipts from the laser game, which had not 
yet been installed. 
Under the unusual circumstances of this case, the 
Commission will not apply sales tax retroactively to the 
transactions in question. To impose the tax would penalize 
Petitioner for its reliance on advice from Auditing Division 
staff. Furthermore, the Petitioner would be unable to recoup 
the tax from its customers, who were originally responsible for 
payment. The Commission therefore holds that Petitioner's 
receipts from its batting cages and roller skating rink are nor 
subject to sales tax for the period of the audit. However, 
Petitioner did not rely en Commission advice in failing to 
collect sales tax on laser game receipts. The Petitioner is 
therefore held liable for payment of tax on those receipts. 
The last issue requiring decision is imposition of 
penalty against Petitioner. As this decision removes the 
assessment of tax on receipts from the batting cages and 
skating rink, penalty and interest based on such assessment 
must also be removed. However, the Commission finds no basis 
for waiving the 10% negligence penalty from those portions of 
the audit which this decision affirms. 
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This matter is remanded to Respondent for the purpose 
of removing from the audit the assessment of sales tax, penalty 
and interest attributable to Petitioner's receipts from its 
roller skating and batting cage activities. The remainder of 
the audit is affirmed, including assessment of sales tax on 
Petitioner's receipts from its laser game. The Commission also 
affirms imposition of a 10% negligence penalty and interest on 
the amount of the amended audit. 
Petitioner is instructed to collect and remit sales 
tax on all activities identified as taxable in Respondent's 
audit, including receipts from batting cages and roller 
skating. If Petitioner has collected any sales tax on such 
activities prior to this decision, such sales tax collections 
must also be remitted to the Commission. It is so ordered. 
DATED this .<j( day of / ^ ^ A ^ ,_. 1991. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
'R. H. Hansen Roger O. Tew 
Chairman Commissioner / 
Maun KMM^ 
>e B. Pacheco / S. Blaine Willes* 
Commissioner Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme.. Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §S63-46b-13(1) , 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
'
;pav^ *Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner G. Blaine ^Dav^is
has been replaced by S. Blaine Willes. Commissioner Willed Ji^s 
been duly advised of the facts and circumstances regarding* th/is 
case, and is qualified to sign this decision. / ^J; 
ALH/2483W /'»- ^\^V 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
49th Street Galleria 
c/o LaVar Christensen 
4998 South 360 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Rick Carlton 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this J) day of /^j*?<?r?/iSs\ 1991 
-9-
n n n n /1 n o >t 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA, 
Petitioner, 
v* 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH ST\TE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent• 
ORDER 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, daced December 10, 1991, filed 
by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final decision 
dated November 20, 1991. 
FINDINGS 
1. Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P) provides that 
a Petition for Reconsideration "will allege as grounds for 
reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery 
of new evidence." Under this ruie, the Tax Commission may exercise 
its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for 
Reconsideration. The points raised in Petitioner's Petition for 
Reconsideration are discussed below, in the order of their 
presentation• 
2. Petitioner argues that because it was advised by 
Audit Division staff that several of its other activities were not 
subject to sales tax, Petitioner was justified in concluding that 
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its laser chase game was also not taxable. Petitioner's argument 
overlooks the fact that it had <*lso been advised by others on the 
Audit Division staff that its activities were subject to sales tax. 
Petitioner chose to accept the advice to its liking and reject the 
contrary advice. Then, without further discussion of the matter 
with Audit Division staff, Petitioner concluded that the laser 
chase game was also not subject to tax. The laser chase game had 
not existed when Audit Division staff initially reviewed 
Petitioner's operation. 
In its previous Order, the Commission waived retroactive 
application of sales tax to those specific activities where 
Petitioner received conflicting advice from different members of 
Audit Division staff. Petitioner did not receive conflicting 
advice regarding the taxability of the laser chase game. The 
Commission therefore reaffirms its decision that the laser chase 
game is subject to sales tax. 
3. Petitioner also contends the Commission did not 
respond to its challenge to the administration rules under which 
sales tax was imposed on Petitioner's various activities. In 
effect, Petitioner argues that such rules exceed the scope of 
Utah's Sales Tax Act. The Commission recognizes that payment of 
sales tax cannot be required other than as authorized by the Sales 
Tax Act. However, the Commission is authorized to prescribe rules 
in conformity with the Act to ascertain and assess the tax imposed 
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by the Act. (See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-118.) The rules upon which 
the assessment was made in this case are an application of the 
foregoing rulemaking authority. The rules themselves have remained 
unchanged for many years, with no legislative direction to the 
contrary. The Commission therefore finds no merit: in Petition's 
challenge to those rules. 
4. Petitioner contends that §59-12-103(1)(f) of the 
Sales Tax Act and the administrative rules pertaining to that 
portion of the Act are unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner has 
framed its objections in conclusionary language, with no citation 
of authority and minima] analysis. The Commission therefore 
rejects Petition's challenge -co the constitutionality of the 
statute and rules. 
5. Petitioner further a3:gues that no logical distinction 
can be drawn between bowling, which is not subject to sales tax, 
and batting cages, which are subject to tax. The Commission 
recognizes that distinctions between the two activities are 
difficult to draw. The exemption of bowling from sales tax is 
largely historical and perhaps would not exist if a fresh look at 
the issue were possible. Even so, the fact that receipts from 
bowling may have been excluded from taxation for historical reasons 
does not require that receipts from batting cages also be excluded, 
where such receipts are otherwise subject to sales tax under the 
Sales Tax Act. 
-3-
Appeal No. 90-1055 
6. The Petitioner also contends that it has overpaid 
other sales taxes and is therefore entitled to an offset against 
the sales tax liability imposed by the audit which is the subject 
of this appeal. The Petitioner did not pursue such a position 
during the hearing in this matter, nor has any specific claim for 
refund been submitted. Petitioner may claim such a refund in the 
manner provided by law and regulation. 
1. Finally, the Commission must correct Petitioner's 
misstatements regarding a draft informal opinion prepared during 
1985 by an Assistant Utah Attorney General. Petitioner contends 
the Commission concealed the opinion because it was favorable to 
Petitioner's position. First, the so called opinion is merely a 
draft that was never signed, never approved by the Attorney General 
and never accepted by the Commission. Second, the Commission has 
made no effort to conceal the draft. The Petitioner has a copy of 
the draft, which has been made a part of the record in this matter. 
The draft is not binding on the Commission, and the Commission has 
rejected its conclusions for the reasons stated in the Commission's 
original decision. 
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DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoingf it is the decision and order of 
the Utah State Tax Commission thcit the Petition for Reconsideration 
is denied. It is so ordered, 
) / 1 DATED this JO' day of 
~7 6&L 
, 1992 
DER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
>e B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
/ S- Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of final order to 
file in Supreme Court a petition for judicial review. Utah Code 
Ann. §§63-46b-13(l), 63-46b-14( 2) (a) . .-^'V/7^-. 
Ah/sd/90- 1C55.ord 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
49th Street Galleria 
c/o LaVar Christensen 
4998 South 360 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wel3s Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
James H. Rogers 
Director, A\iditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Rick Carlton 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor-
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this /{/ day of S^/fS^A / 1992 
g ^ L ^ ^ ^ r ^ . 
Secreta 
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